This paper deals with multidimensional dynamic risk measures induced by conditional gexpectations. A notion of multidimensional g-expectation is proposed to provide a multidimensional version of nonlinear expectations. By a technical result on explicit expressions for the comparison theorem, uniqueness theorem and viability on a rectangle of solutions to multidimensional backward stochastic differential equations, some necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the constancy, monotonicity, positivity, homogeneity and translatability properties of multidimensional conditional g-expectations and multidimensional dynamic risk measures; we prove that a multidimensional dynamic g-risk measure is nonincreasingly convex if and only if the generator g satisfies a quasi-monotone increasingly convex condition. A general dual representation is given for the multidimensional dynamic convex g-risk measure in which the penalty term is expressed more precisely. It is shown that model uncertainty leads to the convexity of risk measures. As to applications, we show how this multidimensional approach can be applied to measure the insolvency risk of a firm with interacted subsidiaries; optimal risk sharing for γ-tolerant g-risk measures is investigated. Insurance g-risk measure and other ways to induce g-risk measures are also studied at the end of the paper.
INTRODUCTION
Quantifying the risk of the uncertainty in the future value of a portfolio is one of the key tasks of risk management. This quantification is usually achieved by modeling the uncertain payoff as a random variable, to which then a certain functional is applied. Such functionals are usually called risk measures. Coherent risk measures have been introduced by Heath (1997, 1999) , and further developed by Delbaen (2000 Delbaen ( , 2002 ; sublinear risk measures by Frittelli (2000) ; convex risk measures by Föllmer and Schied (2002a,b) and Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin (2002) . In all these papers, static risk measures are under consideration. However practically we are interested in monitoring the riskiness of a position ξ at any intermediate time t between the initial date 0 and the final T . The dynamical risk measure represents the riskiness at time t, taking into account all the information available up to date t. A class of dynamic risk measures, called g-risk measure, can be obtained by means of conditional g-expectations (Jiang (2008); Rosazza Gianin (2006) ). In particular, any dynamic g-risk measure satisfies the "time-consistency property". Note that the notion of time consistency first appeared in Peng (2005) under the Brownian filtration. See Klöppel and Schweizer (2007) , Bion-Nadal (2008a , 2009a and references therein for more recent papers dealing with dynamic risk measures on a filtered probability space. Particularly Bion-Nadal (2008a , 2009a characterized the time consistency by a "cocycle condition" for the minimal penalty function of a convex risk measure. And using the theory of BMO 1 martingales, she also provided a new class of time consistent risk measures even with jumps. A characterization of time consistency for a concave monetary utility function in terms of its acceptance set was presented in Cheridito, Delbaen, and Kupper (2006) . Further discussions on dynamic risk measures can be found in Barrieu and El Karoui (2006) , Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin (2004) , Jobert and Rogers (2008) , Roorda, Schumacher, and Engwerda (2005) , among many others. The variety and complexity of the many risk factors and their interaction give rise to the need for a multidimensional approach to risk measurement. The nature of complex marketable assets has increased the requirements for necessary analytical methods. These methods must deal with the multiplicity of risk sources and their correlations. Many economists and mathematical finance scholars have attempted to achieve a multidimensional framework for risk analysis (Fong and Vasicek (1997) ; Jouini, Meddeb, and Touzi (2004) ; Kulikov (2007) ). The notion of multidimensional static risk measure was introduced in Jouini, Meddeb, and Touzi (2004) and Kulikov (2007) . The objective of the paper is to deal with multidimensional dynamic risk measures induced by multidimensional conditional g-expectations. To obtain a preliminary intuition of g-risk measures, we give a brief introduction. Let Y 1 , . . . , Y n be the unique solution to multidimensional backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE for short) (2.1). Y 1 , . . . , Y n is also called multidimensional conditional g-expectation here, denoted by E ] are related to each other through the generator (g 1 , . . . g n ). See the application section for more intuitive examples. Note that the g-risk measure depends heavily on its generator g. The coefficient g can be interpreted as infinitesimal risk measure over a time interval [t, t + dt] as pointed out in Barrieu and El Karoui (2006) . The choice of g is crucial. Particularly, Chen and Epstein (2002) showed that the function g could depend on the preferences of investors. For one dimensional case, based on results in Coquet, Hu, Memin, and Peng (2002) , Peng (2005) , Delbaen, Peng, and Rosazza Gianin (2010) , authors there showed that almost any dynamic risk measure under a Brownian filtration (satisfying certain domination condition) can be represented by a conditional g-expectation and an explicit representation of the penalty term of general dynamic concave utilities with continuity from above can be obtained by applying the theory of g-expectation. This is also a motivation for us to investigate multidimensional risk measures induced by multidimensional g-expectations.
g-expectations which were introduced in Peng (1997) provide an excellent explanation for the famous Allais's paradox. g-expectation is an extension of the classical mathematical expectation. It preserves much of the properties of standard mathematical expectation except the linearity. The notion of g-expectation can be applied to describe nonlinear recursive utilities, risk measures and the pricing of contingent claims, see El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (1997) and references therein for an overview of applications.
As far as now, few papers studied multidimensional g-expectations. One of the important reasons is that we can not give an explicit necessary and sufficient condition for the comparison theorem of solutions of multidimensional backward stochastic differential equations, and the form of the multidimensional comparison theorem is more complicated than the 1-dimensional one. Starting from the point of backward stochastic viability property (BSVP) in Buckdahn, Quincampoix, and Rascanu (2000) , Hu and Peng (2006) gave a necessary and sufficient condition under which the comparison theorem holds for multidimensional BSDEs. This paper develops an explicit expression for the necessary and sufficient condition of the multidimensional comparison theorem which leads the multidimensional comparison theorem to be more applicable.
Note that the multidimensional g-expectation is not a notion just by putting together several one dimensional g-expectations. It has its own complications due to the high dimensions. For a one dimensional g-risk measure induced by a g-expectation, the monotonicity holds naturally due to the comparison theorem of BSDEs. But for multidimensional g-risk measures we need the "quasi-monotonicity condition" of the generator g throughout the paper. For the multidimensional case any axiom is a strong condition. In fact one should add axioms to multidimensional g-risk measures carefully. We will see later that if one expect to find examples of g-risk measures which satisfy the axioms of monotonicity and translation invariance, one may discover that the multidimensional g-risk measure is in fact n one dimensional g-risk measures put together. We extend notions of convex and coherent risk measures in this paper by dropping the axiom of translation invariance.
We also present some applications of multidimensional g-risk measures. As interpreted in Kirman (1997) and Kirman, Oddou, and Weber (1986) , economic agents do, in fact, communicate with each other and learn from each other. They also infer information from the actions of others and, most importantly, in most markets they trade with each other. Within a multi-business firm, subsidiaries interact with each other. If we understand how their mutual interactions influence the decisions, we can model their insolvency risk as a multidimensional BSDE. Recall that Jarrow (2002) measured the insolvency risk of a firm by the cost of a put option written on the firm's net value. Such an option guarantees that the value of the firm's assets will always be greater than or equal to the value of the firm's liabilities. So the firm could write a set of related put options for her subsidiaries to protect them against insolvency. The measure defined by the price of the put option is called "Put Premium Risk Measure". The acceptance set generated by this put premium risk measure generates a risk measure satisfying the axiom of translation invariance but may violating time consistency except that the original put premium risk measure also satisfies the axiom of translation invariance. This risk measure characterizes the minimal capital required to protect the firm's subsidiaries against insolvency.
To deduce properties of multidimensional g-risk measures, we have to make some mathematical preliminaries first. Readers who are interested only in financial applications can jump to section 4 and 5 with little knowledge about BSDEs. The paper is organized as follows. Some results on backward stochastic viability property are recalled in section 2. Section 3 contains the explicit expressions for the multidimensional comparison theorem and viability on a rectangle. Some basic properties and Jensen's inequality for multidimensional g-expectations are studied in section 4. Section 5 deals with multidimensional dynamic risk measures induced by multidimensional conditional g-expectations. The multidimensional g-risk measure is shown to be a multidimensional dynamic time consistent risk measure. We prove that a multidimensional dynamic g-risk measure is nonincreasingly convex if and only if the generator g satisfies a quasi-monotone increasingly convex condition. A general dual representation is also given for a multidimensional dynamic convex g-risk measure in which the penalty term is expressed more precisely. An application of our multidimensional approach is taken into account to measure the insolvency risk of a multi-business firm with interacted business units. Optimal risk sharing for γ-tolerant g-risk measures is investigated. Insurance g-risk measure, multidimensional g-pricing mechanism and stochastic differential utility are also considered.
BACKWARD STOCHASTIC VIABILITY PROPERTY AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL COMPARISON
Let (B t ) t∈[0,T ] be a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω, F, P ) and (F t ) t∈[0,T ] be the augmented Brownian filtration generated by (B t ) t∈[0,T ] . Let T < 0 be a fixed time. For any Euclidean space H, we define for p ≥ 1, L p F (0, T ; H):={all H-valued and
={the space of all H-valued and F T -measurable random variables such that E [|ξ| p ] < ∞}. We say x ≥ y, for x, y ∈ R n , if x i ≥ y i , for all i = 1, 2, ..., n. Let e i , i = 1, ..., n, denote the orthogonal basis of
Consider the following n-dimensional BSDE:
where the terminal variable ξ ∈ L 2 (F T ; R n ) and the function g :
We call (ξ, g, T ) the standard parameters of BSDE (2.1).
For the function g, we assume throughout the paper that (H1) P -a.s., ∀(y, z), t → g(t, y, z) is continuous; (H2) There exists a constant L 0 such that P -a.s., we have: ∀t, ∀(y, y ), ∀(z, z ),
Let K be a nonempty closed convex set of R n . We define Π K (a) as the projection of point a onto K, and d K (·) the distance function of K. The following proposition comes from Buckdahn, Quincampoix, and Rascanu (2000) . Throughout this paper, it is understood that an equation or an inequality holds true always in the sense of P -a.s.. Proposition 2.1 Suppose that g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3). Then the following are equivalent:
where C > 0 is a constant which does not depend on (t, y, z), D 2 f (y) denotes the second order derivative of the function f.
For the following two BSDEs,
Hu and Peng (2006) proved Proposition 2.2 Suppose that g 1 , g 2 satisfy (H1) ∼(H3). Then the following are equivalent:
where C > 0 is a constant.
We could not get an obvious intuition of a greater-than or less-than relation between g 1 and g 2 through (2.5). An explicit expression of (2.5) is given in the next section just like the well known one dimensional comparison theorem, see Theorem 2.2 in El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (1997) .
EXPLICIT EXPRESSION FOR MULTIDIMENSIONAL COMPARISON THEOREM AND VIABILITY ON A RECTANGLE

Comparison theorem
This subsection presents a criterion equivalent to condition (2.5) given by Hu and Peng (2006) . This criterion, of simpler form than Hu and Peng's condition has been exploited as a sufficient condition to prove the multidimensional comparison theorem by Zhou H. (1999) and Zhou S. (2004) . By a short and forward calculus, we show that Hu and Peng's criterion coincides with condition in Zhou H. (1999) .
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that g 1 , g 2 satisfy (H1) ∼(H3). Then the following are equivalent:
(ii) For any k=1,2,...,n, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀y ∈ R n ,
2 Here we follow notations in Hu and Peng (2006) for easy comparison. We denote by δ k y a constant belonging to R n associated with g k and (δ k y) k , the kth component of δ k y.
Proof. From Proposition 2.2, (i) is equivalent to
Taking z k = z k , dividing 4y k and letting y k → 0 − , we deduce that g 1 k (t, δ k y + y , z) ≥ g 2 k (t, y , z ). Conversely, From assumption (H2) and condition (ii), we have ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀y ∈ R n , ∀z, z ∈ R n×d and z = (z 1 , z 2 , ..
Then we have for y = y k · e k , y k ∈ R, y k < 0,
when getting the second inequality, we use 2ab ≤ a 2 + b 2 . From (3.3) we deduce easily that
By Theorem 3.1 and its proof , we have the following corollary which has been given in Hu and Peng (2006) . Corollary 3.1 Suppose that g 1 = g 2 = g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3). Then the following are equivalent:
(ii) For any k = 1, 2, ..., n, for any t and y , g k does not depend on (z j ) j =k and
Proof. In (3.1), let δ k y = 0, z = (z 1 , ..., z n ), z = (0, ..., z k , ..., 0), and interchange positions of z and z, we can deduce that for any t and y, g k does not depend on (z j ) j =k . Then the equivalency of (i) and (ii) is a consequence of Theorem 3.1.
Remark 3.1 If condition (3.4) holds for g, we say that g(t, ·, z) is quasi-monotonously increasing. The "quasi-monotonously increasing" condition was first introduced for stochastic differential equations by Mel'nikov (1983) and later cited by Geiβ and Manthey (1994) , Ding and Wu (1998) to prove a comparison theorem for multidimensional stochastic differential equations.
When condition (3.4) holds for g, by a direct calculation, the Lipschitz condition
for each k = 1, . . . , n.
Uniqueness theorem
For two multidimensional BSDEs, if their generators coincide, of course they have the same solution; conversely if for any same terminal datum, they always have the same solution, do their generators coincide? We give an affirmative answer in Theorem 3.2.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3). Then the following are equivalent:
Proof. Consider the following BSDE over time interval [0, t] ,
where for y = (
. Then (i) is equivalent to the following:
Applying Proposition 2.1 to BSDE (3.6) and the convex closed set K × R n , obviously (iii) is equivalent to (ii).
As a consequence of Proposition 3.1, we have the following uniqueness result for generators of multidimensional BSDEs (2.4).
if and only if for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, ∀(t, y, z)
Putting in (3.7) y = y k · e k , where y k ∈ R, y k > 0, z = z , we deduce that for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, y, z) . Similarly the case "y k < 0" leads to that "g 1 ≥ g 2 ". Thus we obtain the desired result.
Remark 3.2 Comparison Theorem 3.1 does not imply the above uniqueness result. If one of Y i is increasing in ξ i , then it just implies that "
, in which for any (t, y), g k does not depend on (z j ) j =k , due to the "quasi-monotonicity condition" (3.4). Note that in Theorem 3.2, g could depend on (z 1 , . . . , z n ).
Viability on a rectangle
Rectangles are special closed convex subset of R n . We first give explicit expressions for necessary and sufficient conditions for non-negative and non-positive solutions of BSDEs.
Theorem 3.3 Suppose that g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3). Then the following are equivalent:
Proof. If (i) holds, then from Proposition 2.1, we have
Thus we can get easily that−4 y − , g(t, y + , z) ≤ 2
The result in the case "ξ ≤ 0" can be deduced from the preceding case "ξ ≥ 0" applied to the well chosen function g(t, y, z) :
Minus C ∈ R n on both sides of BSDE (2.2), we have (3.10)
y, z) = g(r, y + C, z), then apply Theorem 3.3 to the following (3.11)
we have
if and only if for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
if and only if for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], for any t and C,
In fact the condition (3.4) is not necessary for the constancy (see Theorem 4.1(i) in Section 4).
MULTIDIMENSIONAL g-EXPECTATIONS
Basic properties
A BSDE is in fact a dynamical mechanism of nonlinear expectation. It is natural to define multidimensional g-expectation by multidimensional BSDEs.
The following properties hold for the multidimensional conditional g-expectation.
if and only if for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀y ∈ R n , g k does not depend on (z j ) j =k and
Proof. (i) The sufficiency is obvious. We now prove the necessity. Let (Y s ) be the first part of solution (Y, Z) of
Minus C ∈ R n on both sides of BSDE (4.2) and let
Let z = 0, (coordinate-wise), y = y k · e k in (4.3), y k ∈ R + , and y k → 0 + , we get that for any
(ii) and (iii) are consequences of Corollary 3.1 and Theorem 3.3 respectively. The time consistency (iv) is due to the uniqueness of solution of BSDE (2.2).
To prove (v), applying Theorem 3.2 to the following two BSDEs:
if and only if g(t, ay, az) = ag(t, y, z). When a = 0, it is just the constancy.
Remark 4.1 The constancy in Theorem 4.1 is for all constant in R n . In fact for any fixed C ∈ R n , we still have
The proof is analogous. For instance, given C ∈ R n , a g-expectation with generator g := r(y − C) + θz has the property of constancy for only C.
Remark 4.2 We do not impose in advance special conditions on multidimensional g-expectations in order to explore the general relations between g-expectations and their generating mechanism g, which is good for showing the essence of properties for multidimensional g-expectations. As we see above, multidimensional g-expectations are more complicated than the 1-dimensional one because they are related to different dimensions.
Jensen's inequality
. This section shows that if Jensen's inequality holds for a multidimensional conditional g-expectation, then the gexpectation consists in fact of n one dimensional g-expectations with generator g satisfying positively homogeneous and negatively super-homogeneous conditions w.r.t. z.
and for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, a.s., ∀s ∈ [0, t],
Let ξ k be the payoff of a derivative at time
be its price at time 0. The above Jensen's inequality means that a convex transformation of the payoff ξ k at time T yields a higher price than the convex transformation of the initial price. So traders in financial markets should take care of this difference. For instance, consider a European call option with payoff max [(S T − L) , 0], where S T is the price of the underlying stock at time T , L is the strike price. If Jensen's inequality holds, then
, which means that the price of the call option is greater than the nonnegative value obtained by a direct calculation of (S T − L).
Jensen's inequality is in fact a comparison for solutions of two BSDEs. Let ϕ k (x) = x + a, x ∈ R, a ∈ R + . From the Jensen's inequality we get that E t
So it is natural to require the "quasi-monotonicity condition" (3.4) for the generator g. Remark 4.3 Jensen's inequality can be used to evaluate the nonlinear expectation operator
For a nonlinear expectation E t g , we have to impose additional conditions on g to obtain Jensen's inequality.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3) and condition (3.4). Jensen's inequality for a multidimensional conditional g-expectation holds if and only if (i) for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, g k does not depend on y and
Proof. If condition (i) holds, the multidimensional g-expectation is in fact n one dimensional g-expectation. Then by analogous proof of Jensen's inequality for one dimensional g-expectation (see Jiang and Chen (2004) ), we can obtain the multidimensional Jensen's inequality.
We wish to emphasize some interesting aspects above the converse. Assume that Jensen's inequality for a multidimensional conditional g-expectation holds. For any y ∈ R n , take ϕ y (x) = x + y, x ∈ R n . From the Jensen's inequality and the "monotonicity" of
For BSDE (4.5) and BSDE (4.6), by Comparison Theorem 3.1, we have for any k = 1, 2, ..., n,
Similarly taking ϕ −y (x) = x − y, then we can also get that
From (4.7) and (4.8), it is easy to deduce that g (t, y, z k ) = g (t, 0, z k ). Therefore g does not depend on y. Take ϕ λ (x) = λx, λ ∈ R\{0}, x ∈ R n . From Jensen's inequality and the monotonicity of
(4.10)
For BSDE (4.9) and BSDE (4.10), by Comparison Theorem 3.1, we have for any k = 1, 2, ..., n,
When λ ∈ (0, 1], we have
Thus ∀λ ∈ [1, ∞),
Then combining (4.13) with (4.11), we get that ∀λ ∈ [1, ∞), g k (t, λz k ) = λg k (t, z k ). When λ ∈ (0, 1), the positive homogeneity holds too.
(4.14) and (4.15) lead to that for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, ∀t
Remark 4.4 The above theorem shows that if Jensen's inequality holds for a multidimensional g-risk measure (up to a minus sign, nonlinear expectation), then this risk measure is not recursive (g does not depend on y) in the generating mechanism g and different dimensions are not interacted with each other. The risk could be measured dimension by dimension respectively.
We refer Jia and Peng (2010) for Jensen's inequality of g-convex function under one dimensional g-expectation. g-convexity is a new notion of convex functions. They study this problem from a different point of view: for a given generator g, to characterize the function ϕ (not necessarily convex) such that the Jensen's inequality holds. For Jensen's inequality (4.4) and Jensen's inequality in Jiang and Chen (2004) , we aim to characterize the generator g such that the Jensen's inequality holds for all convex functions. Note also that a convex function is not necessarily a g-convex function.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL DYNAMIC RISK MEASURES
Since Artzner et al.'s seminal work on coherent risk measures, see Heath (1997, 1999) , many authors are interested in the problem of how to measure the risk of a financial position as mentioned in the introduction. However they discover that the classical risk measure -VaR, could not satisfy some natural time-consistency. The notion of time-consistency was first proposed by Peng (2005) for nonlinear expectations (up to a sign, nonlinear risk measures) in the framework of Brownian filtration. Recently a lot of papers concern time-consistent dynamic risk measures, see Bion-Nadal (2008a , 2009a , Cheridito, Delbaen, and Kupper (2006) , Klöppel and Schweizer (2007) for characterizations of time consistency on a general filtered probability space; see Peng (2005) , Rosazza Gianin (2006), Jiang (2008) for dynamic g-risk measures introduced by BSDEs; see also Barrieu and El Karoui (2006) , Jobert and Rogers (2008) and Roorda, Schumacher, and Engwerda (2005) for time consistent risk measures. This section defines a multidimensional risk measure by multidimensional g-expectation and shows its properties and applications.
Let (Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P ) be a filtered probability space. Let G T be the space of all financial positions with maturity T , i.e., the set of R n -valued F T -measurable functions defined on Ω. An element of G T may be the net worth at maturity T of a financial contract, or the accounting value of a firm's equity, or the surplus of an insurance company.
represents the riskiness of financial position ξ ∈ G T . ξ is acceptable if ρ[ξ] ≤ 0, and unacceptable otherwise.
Condition (A5) means that "zero position, zero risk". Rosazza Gianin (2006) The downside risk of a position is reduced if the payoff profile is increased. In a sense, the additional information available to the agent has to be fully used when assessing the riskiness of a payoff ξ, which means in particular that if we know that certain event A ∈ F s is prevailing, then the riskiness of ξ should depend on only what is really possible to happen, i.e. on the restriction of ξ to A. This is characterized by (A4). The property (A4) is equivalent to:
, ∀ξ ∈ G t , ∀A ∈ F s . We refer to Detlefsen and Scandolo (2005) and Peng (2005) for the proofs.
Multidimensional g-risk measure
We call the generator g risk mechanism. In the sequence we consider G t =L 2 (F t ; R n ).
Definition 5.2 Suppose that the risk mechanism g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3).
, as the multidimensional static g-risk measure and multidimensional dynamic g-risk measure respectively. Without ambiguity, we denote
The financial meaning of ρ g t [ξ] is: Let ξ be the negative part of an uncertain income at time T , then −ξ represents the potential loss at time T . Mathematically speaking, losses are viewed as negative gains. The g-expectation is in fact a pricing operator (Peng (2006) ). Therefore E T g [−ξ|F t ] is the discount value at time t of potential loss −ξ. It is the risk for an investor. The kth component ρ
represents the risk of the kth subsidiary of a firm. ρ
The link between measures of risk and BSDEs is particularly interesting because it enhances interpretation and tractability of risk measures. Barrieu and El Karoui (2006) point out that the coefficient g of BSDEs can be interpreted as infinitesimal risk measure over a time interval [t, t + dt] as E[dY t |F t ] = −g(t, Y t , Z t )dt where Z t is the local volatility of the conditional risk measure, V (dY t |F t ) = |Z t | 2 dt. Choosing carefully the coefficient g enables to generate dynamic g-risk measures that are locally compatible with the views and practice of different agents in the market.
For multidimensional g-risk measures, additional condition has to be imposed to insure the monotonicity. Even for the convex and coherent risk measures in the next section, the quasimonotonicity condition (3.4) is indispensable. It is easy to prove 
Multiply 1 A on both sides of the above two BSDEs, since ∀ (y, z) ∈ R n × R n×d ,
Comparing the above two BSDEs, by the uniqueness of solution of BSDE (−ξ1 A , g, t), we obtain
The proof is complete. 
Multidimensional convex and coherent risk measures
Consider two strategies: one leads to the potential loss ξ 1 , while another leads to the potential loss ξ 2 . If one diversifies, spending only the fraction λ of the resources on the first strategy and using the remaining part for the second alternative, the potential loss is λξ 1 + (1 − λ)ξ 2 . Thus, the axiom of convexity gives a precise meaning to the idea that diversification should not increase the risk. Monotonicity is a natural condition for one dimensional g-risk measures. Here we still need it for multidimensional g-risk measures. For a convex g-risk measure, we have Theorem 5.2 Suppose that the risk mechanism g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3). For any t ∈ [0, T ], for all risk positions ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ L 2 (F t ; R n ), the multidimensional dynamic g-risk measure ρ g s,t [·] is nonincreasing and convex if and only if ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀(y i , z i ) ∈ R n × R n×d , i = 1, 2, for all k = 1, 2, ..., n, g k does not depend on (z j ) j =k and ∀λ ∈ [0, 1],
Then the convexity and monotonicity of ρ
satisfies Y ∈ R n + × R n × R n . Applying Proposition 2.1 to the above BSDE and the set R n + × R n × R n , it is easy to see that (i) is equivalent to (ii) ∀t, ∀(y, y ), ∀(z, z ),
where C > 0 is a constant which does not depend on (t, y, z).
Similarly to Theorem 3.1, (ii) is equivalent to
for any δ k y ∈ R n such that δ k y ≥ 0, (δ k y) k = 0 and z, z 1 , z 2 ∈ R n×d , z k = λz 1 k + (1 − λ)z 2 k . Let λ = 1, δ k y = 0. we obtain that g k (t, y 1 , z) ≤ g k (t, y 1 , z 1 ), for any z, z 1 ∈ R n×d such that z k = z 1 k . Then it is easy to deduce that g k does not depend on (z j ) j =k . Thus (5.6) holds true.
For a multidimensional coherent g-risk measure, we have Corollary 5.1 Suppose that the risk mechanism g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3). The multidimensional dynamic risk measure ρ g s,t [·] is nonincreasing and coherent if and only if for all k = 1, 2, ..., n, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀y ∈ R n , g k does not depend on (z j ) j =k , ∀a ∈ R + , (5.9) g k (t, ay, az k ) = ag k (t, y, z k ),
Proof. Note that a coherent risk measure is equivalent to a risk measure which is convex and positively homogeneous and for a positively homogeneous function, it is subadditive if and only if it is convex. Thus this corollary holds.
There are examples of dynamic risk measure on filtered probability spaces which are more general than those generated by a Brownian motion. See Bion-Nadal (2008a , 2009a and Klöppel and Schweizer (2007) . Even in the case of Brownian filtration, g-risk measures generated by Lipschitz drivers can not cover the whole. See the well known entropic risk measure introduced by Föllmer and Schied (2002b) and Barrieu and El Karoui (2006) which is characterized by a quadratic BSDE. There are also coherent risk measure satisfying the axioms of positive homogeneity and subadditivity but can not be expressed by a g-expectation. Peng (2010) introduced a kind of sublinear expectation, called G-expectation (capital G), via a class of mutually singular probability measures and found some applications on coherent risk measure. See Bion-Nadal and Kervarec (2012), Nutz and Soner (2010) for further study on risk measuring under model uncertainty.
Dual representation for multidimensional dynamic convex g-risk measure
In this section x ∈ R n means a row vector if without specification. Let * denote the transposition of a vector or a matrix. For a matrix A m×m , we define exp{A} = ∞ n=0 1 n! A n . Let ρ g t [·] be a convex g-risk measure defined in Definition 5.3. Let g be the generator such that for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, g k does not depend on (z j ) j =k , quasi-increasingly convex in (y, z k ), i.e. satisfying (5.6) and (Y, Z) the solution of BSDE associated to the pair (ξ, g). We consider the Fenchel-Legendre transform of g k , k = 1, 2, ..., n,
Since g is convex and Lipschitz continuous, we have the duality relation
where
G . We denote by A the set of bounded progressively measurable processes(β, γ) with (β k , γ k ), k = 1, 2, ..., n valued in
The boundedness condition on A means that for any (β, γ) ∈ A, there exists a constant (dependent of (β, γ)) such that |β k t |+|γ k t | ≤ C, t-a.e, P -a.s., k = 1, 2, ..., n. Let us consider the family of linear generators
Given (β, γ) ∈ A, we denote by (Y β,γ , Z β,γ ) the solution to the following linear BSDE, (5.12)
where we denote
Theorem 5.3 Suppose that the risk mechanism g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3) and condition (3.4). The multidimensional dynamic convex risk measure ρ
where Q γ is the probability measure with density process dL t = L t γ t dB t , L 0 = 1 and α
Proof. Observe from relation (5.11) and the "quasi-monotonicity condition" (3.4) that for all (β, γ) ∈ A, for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, ∀t
Furthermore, since G is convex with a linear growth condition on its effective domain, for each (t, ω, y, z), the supremum in the relation (5.11) is attained at ( b(t, y, z), c(t, y, z)) belonging to the subdifferential of −g, and so (| b|, | c|) is bounded by the Lipschitz constant of g. By a measurable selection theorem (see e.g. Appendix in Chapter III of Dellacherie and Meyer (1975) ), since Y, Z are progressively measurable, we may find a pair of bounded progressively measurable processes ( β, γ) such that for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, ∀t
Then by the Uniqueness Theorem 3.2, these two solutions coincide, and so
Then by solving the linear BSDE (5.12), we end the proof. The elements of A can be interpreted as possible probabilistic models, which are taken more or less seriously according to the size of the penalty α β (Q γ ). Thus, the value ρ g t [ξ] is computed as the worst-case expectation taken over all models Q γ and penalized by α β (Q γ ). Note that each Q γ is equivalent to the probability measure P with Radon-Nykodim derivative Peng, and Rosazza Gianin (2010) for the representation of the penalty term of one dimensional dynamic concave utilities by the theory of one dimensional g-expectation. The representation of coherent g-risk measure is a particular case of the above representation since it corresponds to the conjugacy function G = 0 or +∞.
Corollary 5.2 Suppose that the risk mechanism g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3) and condition (3.4). For the multidimensional dynamic coherent risk measure ρ
(Ω, F T , P ; R n ), the following representation holds:
where Q γ is the probability measure with density process dL t = L t γ t dB t , L 0 = 1.
Cash additive risk measures
Definition 5.5 A multidimensional dynamic g-risk measure ρ g s,t [·] is called cash additive risk measure if it satisfies the translation invariance:
Theorem 5.4 Suppose that the risk mechanism g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3). The multidimensional dynamic g-risk measure ρ 
(5.18)
For BSDE (5.17) and BSDE (5.18), by the Uniqueness Theorem 3.2, we obtain the necessary and sufficient condition: for any k = 1, 2, ..., n, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀(y, z) ∈ R n × R n×d , (5.19) g(t, y − C, z) = g(t, y, z).
Due to the arbitrariness of (y, z, C), we deduce that g does not depend on y.
The above cash additivity also holds conditionally:
The cash additivity property is also called translation invariance. While the convexity and the monotonicity axioms have been largely accepted by academics and practitioners, the cash additive axiom has been criticized from an economic viewpoint. A basic reason is that while regulators and financial institutions determine and collect today the reserve amounts to cover future risky positions, the cash additivity requires that risky positions and reserve amounts are expressed in the same numéraire. This is a stringent requirement that limits the applicability of cash additive risk measures. Moreover, the cash additive axiom does not allow to account for stochastic discount factor. El Karoui and Ravanelli (2009) relaxed the cash additivity axiom to cash subadditivity. By Theorem 5.4, a multidimensional g-risk measure satisfying the cash additive axiom and the monotonicity axiom is in fact n one dimensional g-risk measures put together. For a g-risk measure with generator g := −r t y+ g(t, z), where g(t, 0) = 0, the corresponding g-risk measure ρ g t,T [·] satisfies the following translation invariance axiom:
r s ds).
Model uncertainty and robust measurement of risks
When making a decision, different traders may use different probability measures. When measuring the risk of a financial position, we may face several models to choose. In these cases, we are interested in knowing the minimum and maximum of a family of risk measures.
Assume that there is a family of multidimensional g-risk measures ρ g α s,t with parameters (g α , ξ α ) satisfying (H1) ∼(H3) and condition (3.4). We will show that, under some mild conditions, the supremum ess sup Theorem 5.5 Suppose that there is an α such that ∀(y, z), P-a.s., t-a.e.
(5.21) g(t, y, z) = ess sup α g α (t, y, z) = g α (t, y, z),
Proof. Since (g α , ξ α ) and (g, ξ) satisfy the requirement of Comparison Theorem, for any α,
On the other hand, since (g, ξ) is attainable at some α, ρ g s,t [ξ] and ρ g α s,t ξ α are both solutions of BSDE (g α , ξ α ). By the Uniqueness Theorem we get that ess sup
Hence we obtain the desired result. This theorem still holds when "sup" is replaced by "inf". It is a generalization of dual representation for convex and coherent g-risk measures in which {g α } are linear generators. Thus we conclude that
• Convex and coherent g-risk measures are robust risk measures;
• Model uncertainty could lead to the convexity of risk measures. Of course, model uncertainty we consider here is under one same probabilistic framework (or different probability measures which are equivalent to the reference probability measure). Peng (2010) considered coherent risk measures with different probabilistic models which are mutually singular in the language of G-expectation. See also Bion-Nadal and Kervarec (2012) for convex and non-dominated risk measures.
Motivations and Applications
Multidimensional BSDEs have been found several practical applications, among others, see mean-variance hedging in Mania and Tevzadze (2003) , nonzero game in El Karoui and Hamadene (2003) , switching problem in Hu and Tang (2008) , Hamadene and Zhang (2010) and references therein. In this section we shall show how our multidimensional approach can be applied to measure the insolvency risk of interacted business units.
Measuring the insolvency risk of a firm with interacted subsidiaries
One way to measure the insolvency risk of a firm is to use the probability of insolvency itself. It is to determine the minimal amount of capital to add to the firm such that the probability of insolvency is less than or equal to some given probability β. That is to find the minimal α such that P {X + α(1 + r) < 0} ≤ β, where X is the risky asset hold in time T for the firm, r is the interest rate between 0 and T . The solution to the above problem is called Value at Risk (VaR). It is shown that VaR is not a time consistent risk measure by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) . They studied various common risk measures including VaR. However they omitted an intuitive risk measure that one could construct: the cost of an insurance policy protecting the firm against insolvency. Jarrow (2002) defined the premium of a put option on the firm as a measure of insolvency risk. We recall Jarrow's idea detailedly. A firm is in fact a portfolio of assets and liabilities. The firm's net value is the value of the firm's assets minus liabilities. A measure of insolvency risk is the cost of buying a put option written on the firm' net value with zero strike price. Such a put option could guarantee that the firm's net value will always be greater than or equal to zero.
Let us be more precise. Let (Ω, F, P ) be a probability space. Let G T denote the space of all financial positions with maturity T , i.e., the set of R n -valued functions defined on Ω. Let r denote the interest rate between time 0 and T . A firm is defined by its balance sheet at time T . The balance sheet consists of assets A ∈ G T , liabilities L ∈ G T , and equity E ∈ G T such that the following accounting identities hold:
We call X = A − L the firm's net value. Note that it maybe negative while E cannot due to its limited liability status. We say the firm is insolvent if X is strictly negative, or else the firm is solvent. Capital relates to the amount of the firm's net value invested in the riskless asset (e.g. cash). It is a different notion from equity. Let X be the risky assets minus liabilities and α be the firm's capital invested at time 0. Then the firm's net value X = X + α(1 + r). We want to quantify the insolvency risk of the firm's net value X = X + α(1 + r). As illustrated above, VaR is a such measure. Now we consider a put option written on the firm's net value X with strike price zero. The terminal condition is
Under the condition of arbitrage-free, Jarrow (2002) defined the "Put Premium Risk Measure" as
It measures the economic cost of avoiding insolvency. This is a single period (static) model. It can be generalized to the dynamic situation.
Recall that the classical Black-Scholes formula corresponds to the following BSDE:
where (r t ) is the instantaneous interest rate, (θ t ) is called a risk premium and (Z t ) is viewed as the portfolio of risk investment. The meaning of (5.26) is that the change of the value of an option equals to the interest income plus the return of risk investment and plus a random noise. See El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (1997) for a derivation. We then can define a dynamic g-risk measure ρ g t,T [ξ] with ξ = max [− (X + α(1 + r)) , 0] and g (t, y, z) = − (r t y + θ t z). Generally in a financial market (may or may not be complete), we can define a more general g-risk measure as the solution of the following BSDE:
The above put option provides insurance against the firm's insolvency. When the firm is insolvent, it pays off and covers the loss X + α(1 + r) < 0. See El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (1997) for an abundance of examples corresponding to various g. The above put premium risk measure can be summarized to more involved cases. Economic agents such as consumers, producers, banks, and stockholders, constantly interact with each other in different ways and for different purposes. They may compete, imitate and communicate with each other or suspect strategies of their counterparties and somehow out of these individual interactions a certain coherence at the aggregate level develops (Kirman (1997) ). The first contribution in which the problem of stochastic interaction was explicitly treated is that of Föllmer (1974) . He showed that if the characteristics of agents, for example their preferences are random but dependent on those of others, the effect of large numbers of agents is not enough to eliminate uncertainty at the aggregate level.
Indeed economic agents are continuously learning and changing their strategies. One is interested in knowing how to measure risks they encounter, in particular the insolvency risk for a firm with a number of interacted subsidiaries. See the following examples.
Example 5.1 Consider a firm with two subsidiaries competing against each other for finite resource (L t ) (e.g. cash income of the firm) at each time t to hedge their possible net values ξ 1 and ξ 2 at time T respectively. Let (r 1suspects his counterparty, the first agent may get α 1 t Y 1 t from the finite resource (L t ) with propor-
To reduce their insolvency risks, the two subsidiaries can decide whether or not to buy a put option with payoff max −ξ i , 0 , i=1,2 at time T. Then a natural problem comes up: how to estimate this put option? Using Jarrow's formula (5.25) or the classical Black-Scholes equation (5.26)? Obviously different pricing formulas or pricing under various markets (complete or incomplete) yield different current values. The current value is the capital a subsidiary needs to protect herself against insolvency. An appropriate and efficient way is that the two subsidiaries estimate the put options by themselves according their own flows of cash payments / incomes. That is, they spend the required capitals (equal to prices of the put options) on investment such that the risk capitals hedge the insolvency risks at time T. Therefore in a complete financial market the pricing processes of the two put options should satisfy
Then (ρ 1
See also the following simple example.
Example 5.2 Consider a multi-business firm with two business units holding stocks of each other for sharing their Profit&Loss. The first unit holds 20% stocks of the second one and the second unit holds 10% stocks of the first one. Thus their insolvency risks can be measured by
It is interesting that Stadje (2010) extended various risk measures in discrete time to the solutions of BSDEs, including VaR, semi-deviation risk measure, Average VaR and Gini risk measure. Thus, BSDEs provide an abundance of dynamic valuations (resp. risk measure) in continuous time. For instance, the entropic risk measure is the most famous example of a convex risk measure, introduced by Föllmer and Schied (2002b) . Barrieu and El Karoui (2006) pointed out that the classical dynamic entropic risk measure under a Brownian filtration corresponds to a quadratic BSDE with generator g = 1 2γ |z| 2 , where γ > 0 is the risk tolerance coefficient.
Along with the rapid development of the financial market, risk relationships will be more and more complicated. For instance, a set of related options, a group of players in a game, companies in the same industry, due to countless ties among them, it is more applicable to consider multidimensional risk measures to control their risks.
Acceptance sets and insurance g-risk measures
From an insolvency point of view, an acceptance set identifies those risk positions that are acceptable such that the firm is solvent. Any risk measure ρ : G T →R n induces an acceptance set
Conversely, for a given acceptance set A, the associated risk measure can be defined as
Within the static framework of risk measures, Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) presented four axioms for an acceptance set should satisfy. And they summarized the relations between a coherent risk measure and its acceptance set. In this section we put emphasis on the following definition:
where ρ g t,T is a g-risk measure. The measure ρ g t,T is the minimal capital required to protect the firm against insolvency at time t. We call it "Insurance Risk Measure" as in Jarrow (2002) . Of course if we define the following acceptance set
can be also written as
If ρ g t,T is convex in the sense of Definition 5.3, it is easy to prove that A t ρ g is convex, i.e. ∀ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ A t ρ g , ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], we have λξ 1 + (1 − λ)ξ 2 ∈ A t ρ g . We are interested in the relation between ρ 
The static risk measure ρ g 0,T induced by ρ g 0,T performs even "better" than the original one because it is always translation invariant and constant-keeping. It extends the notion of "Insurance Risk Measure" in Jarrow (2002) to generally nonlinear case.
It seems to be more reasonable to establish the axiom of cash subadditivity as
An example in the following (Example 5.3) shows that the typical risk-neutral BSDE verifies (5.32) but not (5.31). See Barrieu and El Karoui (2006) for other motivating examples. Now we consider the following (nonnegative) insurance g-risk measure:
Theorem 5.6 Let g satisfy (H1) ∼(H3) and (3.4) and g(·, 0, 0) = 0. Assume also that ρ g t,T
satisfies the cash subadditivity (5.32).
The proofs are trivial. It is interesting that ρ +g t,T may be not time consistent.
Example 5.3 Consider the 1-dimensional risk-neutral BSDE (ξ, g, T ) with g (y) = −ry, r ∈ R + , y ∈ R. The induced g-risk measure ρ g t,T [ξ] = e −r(T −t) · E[−ξ|F t ] satisfies the cash subadditivity (5.32). It is easy to deduce that ρ
+ and it satisfies Theorem 5.6. For ξ = −B T and t ∈ (0, T ], we have
Thus ρ +,g t,T violates the axiom of time consistency for some random variables.
Risk management is different from the firm's and the regulator's perspective. From the point of view of supervision, regulators prefer ρ +g t,T to ρ g t,T while the firms may just choose ρ g t,T to prepare their risk capital.
Optimal risk sharing for γ-tolerant g-risk measures
The topic of optimal risk sharing has been studied early by Borch (1962) in the insurance and reinsurance context and recently by El Karoui (2005, 2006) for cash additive γ-tolerant convex risk measures. For non-homogeneous convex risk measures, the impact of the size of the position is not linear. It seems natural to consider the relation between risk tolerance and the perception of the size of positions. The risk tolerance coefficient γ describes how agent penalize compared with the root risk measure ρ. Precisely a γ-tolerant risk measure is defined as ρ
A typical example is the entropic risk measure e
. The optimal risk sharing between two economic parties, denoted by A and B means that: A want to issue a financial product η ∈ L 2 (F T ) and sell it to B for price π t at time t. A tries to minimize her risk ess inf
The price of η is determined by B as π t = −ρ B t,T [η] . Hence B should have an interest in doing the transaction. At least the product η does not worsen her risk. Then the minimization problem becomes ess inf
which is called inf-convolution of two functionals and denoted by ρ A ρ B [ξ]. Now we consider two groups A and B, measuring their risks by a multidimensional g-risk measure ρ g with different risk tolerant coefficients γ A , γ B ∈ R + , i.e., their risks are measured by ρ 
, it is the unique solution of the following BSDE (5.34)
(ii) (ρ gγ ) γ=∞ is a g ∞ -risk measure with generator g ∞ = lim γ↑+∞ γg t, 
and consequently (
, inequality (5.35) becomes an equality.
] is the unique solution of BSDE (5.34). Furthermore, η * =
is the optimal transfer.
(ii) Since g is Lipschitz (thus dominated by positive-homogeneous functions, see Remark 3.1) and both ρ gγ and g γ := γg t, y γ , z γ are nonincreasing in γ, g ∞ and ρ g∞ are well defined. Then by Theorem 5.5, ρ g∞ is the solution of BSDE with generator g ∞ . Since ρ gγ and ρ g γ are nonincreasing in γ, by a direct calculation, we have
The financial meaning of (i) is obvious: the behavior of risk sharing increases A's risk tolerance capacity which equals to the sum of the risk tolerance of both groups.
Other ways to obtain g-risk measures
There is another way to define risk measure via g-expectation.
Definition 5.6 Suppose that the risk mechanism g satisfies (H1) ∼(H3) and (3.4) and g(·, 0, 0 . A natural question comes up: for a specific risk position ξ, we use which mechanism to measure its risk, or equivalently which mechanism is more robust.
Multidimensional g-pricing mechanisms
In an option market, the ask-bid pricing mechanism is operated through the system of market makers. The ask price and the bid price often do not coincide with each other (see Jouini (2000) , Bion-Nadal (2009b) 
A g-expectation is called a g-pricing mechanism here. We have
for any δ k y ∈ R n such that δ k y ≥ 0, (δ k y) k = 0, and z, z ∈ R n×d with (z) k = (z ) k .
Proof. Let (E t g [−ξ|F s ]) denote the solution of the following BSDE:
(5.37)
Then (−E t g [−ξ|F s ]) solves the following BSDE:
Applying Theorem 3.1 to the above BSDE (5.38) and BSDE (2.2), it is deduced that for all derivative ξ,
An axiomatic approach in continuous time asset pricing is developed in Jouini (2000) . The axiomatization of dynamic pricing procedure in the setting of Brownian filtration is presented in Peng (2005 Peng ( , 2006 in the language of g-expectation. Pricing via dynamic convex risk measures has also been studied by Jobert and Rogers (2008) . Bion-Nadal (2009b) introduced a notion of time consistent dynamic pricing procedure on a filtered probability space which assigns to every essentially bounded financial position a dynamic ask price and a bid price, taking transaction costs and liquidity risk into account. See also Bion-Nadal (2008b) . Characterization of one dimensional g-pricing mechanisms by its generating function was studied sufficiently in Peng (2006) . For a risk mechanism g, if inequality (5.36) holds, then we have ρ
Thus usually we utilize ρ 
Utility-based g-risk measure
Let us consider a small agent who can consume between time 0 and time T . Let c t be the (positive) consumption rate at time t. We assume that there exists a terminal reward ξ at time T . The utility at time t is a function of the instantaneous consumption rate c t and of the future utility (corresponding to the future consumption). In fact, the recursive utility is assumed to satisfy the following BSDE in form of conditional expectation (Duffie and Epstein (1992a,b) ),
We consider a more general class of recursive utilities defined by Peng's BSDE (El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (1997) ),
In general, utilities must satisfy the following classical properties: (a) Monotonicity with respect to the terminal value and to the consumption. (b) Concavity with respect to the consumption. (c) Time consistency: this means that, for any two consumption processes c 1 and c 2 and any time t, if c 1 and c 2 are identical up to time t and if the continuation of c 1 is preferred to the continuation of c 2 at time t, then c 1 is preferred to c 2 at time 0. Certainly by Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 5.2, if g is concave w.r.t (c, y, z), quasi-monotonously increasing w.r.t (c, y), and for any (c, y), the generator g k does not depend on (z j ) j =k , then the above properties are satisfied. From a financial point of view, the generator g (t, u t , z t ) represents the instantaneous utility at time t of consumption rate c t . The dependence of g k on u 1 , · · · , u n can be interpreted as a nonzero-sum game problem, where the players' utilities affect each other and consequently the generators are interconnected.
Let u t be a function of utility, a utility-based risk measure is defined by ρ t = −u t (see Kulikov (2007) for example). Hence we define the utility-based g-risk measure ρ is convex (resp. subadditive). Thus for investigating convex utility-based risk measure, one usually studies concave utility (Kulikov (2007) ).
Observe that by Theorem 5.4, when g does not depend on y, the definition ρ
So generally a risk measure based on a recursive utility is not consistent with definition (5.40). Based on some experimental evidence, Brachinger and Weber (1997) argued that in general a risk measure should not be considered, up to a sign, an utility functional. Let u be a concave, strictly increasing utility function with u(0) = 0. The risk measure ρ u is defined as ρ u [ξ] := inf {α ∈ R| E P [u (ξ + α)] ≥ 0}. Frittelli and Scandolo (2006) also gave a partial support which shows that the preference structure defined by E P u does not coincide with the reverse ordering provided by ρ u , unless u is linear or exponential. Time consistency is a crucial property for utility-based risk measures. Cheridito and Kupper (2009) gave some equivalent conditions for time consistency of a dynamic utility function. It is shown that the agent's indifference prices are recursive if and only if the preferences are translation invariant.
Remark 5.1 Four definitions of g-risk measures are referred in this paper. They are
; if g does not depend on y and g(t, z) = −g(t, −z), then four definitions coincide with each other. Generally they are different definitions. We will continue our work to give insights among them and seek new applications in particular for the last two.
CONCLUSION
During a long time it seems that many problems related to multidimensional BSDEs are expected to be complicated because of the lack of a clear structure of multidimensional BSDEs. This paper, by virtue of certain mathematical tools, establishes some properties of multidimensional g-risk measures. Particularly we show that a multidimensional g-risk measure is nonincreasingly convex if and only if the generator g satisfies a quasi-monotone increasingly convex condition.
Indeed g-risk measures represent a large class of risk measures. In one dimensional case, any dynamic risk measure satisfying certain domination condition can be written as a conditional g-expectation (Coquet, Hu, Memin, and Peng (2002) , Peng (2005) ). As to the multidimensional case, similar result is presented in the appendix. Nevertheless, g-risk measures are interesting by themselves which are strongly linked to a functional g. Choosing carefully the coefficient g enables to generate dynamic g-risk measures that are locally compatible with the views and practice of different agents in the market. Especially a general dual representation of a multidimensional dynamic convex g-risk measure is obtained in which the penalty term is expressed explicitly via the polar function of g. It is shown that model uncertainty could lead to the convexity of risk measures.
Our multidimensional approach provides an alternative way to measure the insolvency risk of a firm with interacted subsidiaries. As pointed out by Jarrow (2002) , the cost of buying a put option written on the firm's net value is an intuitive measure of the insolvency risk of a firm. Optimal risk sharing between two groups with different risk tolerant coefficients is also investigated. We hope that this theory will be included in the toolbox of standard financial software in a near future. Different ways to obtain g-risk measures are compared at the end of the paper.
Finally, there are also several interesting issues such as optimal risk transfer and risk allocation within a group with interacted subsidiaries, we do not consider due to the length of the paper. We will solve these issues in our future publications.
are interacted with each other, or else it is just a notion putting n 1-dimensional risk measures together. Thus, for any k = 1, . . . , n, the kth component ρ 
is well defined on L 2 (Ft; R) and it satisfies (A1)
∼(A4).
The above condition means that fixing other dimensions, the kth dimension is still a risk measure satisfying (A1) ∼(A4) except (A5). The condition of ρ gµ -domination is (A7) For any k = 1, . . . , n, ∀ξ
is the solution of the following 1-dimensional BSDE:
Theorem A.1 Let (A1) ∼(A7) hold for the multidimensional dynamic risk measure ρs,t [·] . Then there exists a function g : Ω × [0, T ] × R n × R n×d −→ R n satisfying the "quasi-monotonicity condition" (3.4) and the Lipschitz condition (H2) and g(·, 0, 0) = 0, such that for any k = 1, . . . , n, ∀ξ ∈ L 2 (Ft; R n ),
We now present the proof in the language of nonlinear expectation. We define the nonlinear expectation operator Es. Observing that E Since Y t,X,C s s∈ [0,t] is an E The proof of the above proposition is quite similar to Proposition A.1 and to Theorem 8.1 in Peng (2005) . We need to construct the following sequence parameterized by m=1,2,. . . 
